Municipal Corporation Held to Be a “Person” Within Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause When Action Is Brought Against a Municipal Corporation in a Foreign State by unknown
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION HELD TO BE A
"PERSON" WITHIN FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT'S DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
WHEN ACTION IS BROUGHT AGAINST A
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION IN A FOREIGN
STATE
In River Vale v. Orangetown' the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that a municipal corporation is a "person"
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment for
purposes of attacking a zoning ordinance of a contiguous
municipal corporation in another state. In order to allow
construction of a large office-research complex, Orangetown, New
York rezoned a residential section on the New Jersey border. River
Vale, the adjoining New Jersey municipality, brought suit for
damages and declaratory relief, claiming that the ordinance was
"arbitrary and capricious" and that the rezoning so depreciated the
value of its property as to be a deprivation of due process of law.
The damage allegedly arose not only from the anticipated property
devaluation and consequent decline in tax revenues but also the
increased expenditures which would be necessary to handle the
resulting traffic and other consequential expenses. Finding that
River Vale's claimed injuries were "sufficiently direct" to confer
standing, the court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal
for lack of jurisdiction 2
The common law power of municipal corporations to sue3
includes suits against other political subdivisions They have
1403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968).
2 Notwithstanding the instant case, it is not entirely clear that a mere decrease in the tax
base is a sufficient injury to allow recovery. -If, as alleged, the supposed withdrawal of
property will diminish the revenues of the state, non constat that the deficiency cannot
readily be made up by an increase in taxation." Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927).
In Franklin Township v. Tugwell, 85 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1936). the court interpreted this to
mean that the remedy for a township which suffers a decreasing tax base as the only effect of
defendant's action is to increase taxes. Id. at 213.
3See. e.g.. Board of Educ. v. Shelby County, 207 Tenn. 330, 339 S.W.2d 569, 584 (1960).
3 Board of Educ. v. Township Council. 48 N.J. 94, 223 A.2d 481 (1966); see. e.g., Rosebud
County v. Flinn. 109 Mont. 537, 98 P.2d 330 (1940); Creskill v. Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26,
100 A.2d 182 (1953), aJJ'd, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954); Leonia v. Fort Lee. 56 N.J.
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standing to contest, zoning ordinances,5 subject to the requirement
that the municipality either directly own property affected by the
ordinance or allege injury to its corporate capacity. However, a
municipality may neither sue merely as a representative of
individual citizens,8 nor contest zoning ordinances in such a
representative capacityY There is growing recognition that zoning
laws may well affect property outside an individual zone and that
nearby property owners should be able to contest such laws.'0 Such
outside property must, however, be in close proximity to the zoned
property." Moreover, zoning laws may be attacked in judicial
Super. 135, 151 A.2d 540 (1959). Moreover, there is a trend toward increased litigation
between municipalities. See Evans, Overlapping, Duplication & Conflicts Anong Municipal
Corporations, 7 VAND. L. REv. 35 (1953); Kenier, The Use of the Police Power by Local
Governments ad Some Problems of Intergovernmental Relations, 8 J. PuB. L. 109 (1959).
5See Creskill v. Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182 (1953), aJfd, 15 N.J. 238, 104
A.2d 441 (1954); Leonia v. Fort Lee, 56 N.J. Super. 135, 151 A.2d 540 (1959); Glen Cove v.
Buxenbaum, 17 App. Div. 2d 828, 233 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1962); Bronxville v. Francis, 206
Misc. 339, 134 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1954).
6 See Somerset v. County Council, 229 Md. 42, 181 A.2d 671 (1962); cj. Scottsdale v.
Municipal Court, 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637 (1962), noted in 5 ARIZ. L. REv. 139 (1963);
31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 525 (1962); 16 VAND. L. REv. 279 (1962).
7See Creskill v. Dumont, 28 N.J. Super. 26, 34, 100 A.2d 182, 192 (1953), affd. 15 N.J.
238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954).
' Wheaton v. Chicago, A. & E. Ry., 3 111. App. 2d 29, 120 N.E.2d 370 (1954).
'Greenbelt v. Jaeger, 237 Md. 456, 206 A.2d 694 (1965).
Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 19 Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (1955); Koppel v. Fairways,
189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962); Jahnigen v. Staley, 245 Md. 130, 225 A.2d 277 (Ct. App.
1967); Baltimore v. N.A.A.C.P., 221 Md. 329, 157 A.2d 433 (1960); Santmyers v.
Oyster Bay, 10 Misc. 2d 614, 169 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1957); Freeman v. Yonkers, 205 Misc. 947,
129 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1954); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597
(1965); Madden v. Zoning Bd., 48 R.I. 175, 136 A. 493 (1927); Note, Nonresidents
Permitted to Protest Proposed Zoning Change, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 161 (1963); Note, Snob
Zoning-A Look at the Economic and Social Impact of Low Density Zoning. 15 SYR. L.
REv. 507 (1964); Note, Regional Impact of Zoning: A Suggested Approach, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 1251 (1966); Note, Zoning: Looking Beyond Municipal Borders, 1965 WAsH. U.L.Q.
107; Note, Zoning Against the Public Welfare: Judicial Limitations on Municipal
Parochialism, 71 YALE L.J. 720 (1962); Harr, Zoning for Minimunt Standards: The Wayne
Township Case, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1051 (1953). It should be noted that there is a trend
toward more rezoning of land near municipal borders. See Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods
for Controlling Community Growth on the Urban Fringe, 1961 Vis. L. Rev. 370. Contra,
Wood v. Freeman, 43 Misc. 2d 616, 251 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1964).
n Pattison v. Corby, 226 Md. 97, 172 A.2d 490 (1961). Compare Greenbelt v. Jaeger, 237
Md. 456, 206 A.2d 694 (1965) (7 1/2 miles away); Marcus v. Montgomery County Council,
235 Md. 535. 201 A.2d 777 (1964) (1/4 to 3/4 mile away), where standing was denied, ith
Smith %,. Board of Appeals, 340 Mass. 230, 163 N.E.2d 654 (1960) (both properties abutted
the same pond); Mocco v. Job, 56 N.J. Super. 468, 153 A.2d 723 (1959) (more than 200 ft.
away), where standing was granted. See also Leonia v. Fort Lee, 56 N.J. Super, 135, 151
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proceedings on constitutional grounds as well as through the usual
administrative procedures. t2 Such actions may raise questions
concerning the municipality's immunity to suit. The political
subdivisions of a state usually do not acquire immunity from
federal jurisdiction under the eleventh amendment,13 even though
the state itself would be immune. 4 While a municipality is not a
sovereign, it is usually immune from suit when it acts as the mere
agent of the state.15 However, it would appear that where a
constitutional right is infringed, application of the Ex Parte
Young 6 rationale would strip the subdivision of its immunity.1 7
The question remains, however, whether a municipal
corporation is entitled to the protection of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Although private corporations are
protected, 8 the clause has been held not to protect the United
States" or the several states,20 on the theory that the rights
A.2d 540 (1959), where defendant's construction of a 10-foot "buffer zone" was held to be
an adquate safeguard for nearby property owners.
1- Nectow v. Cambridge. 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment); Bell v. Studdard, 220 Ga. 756. 141 S.E.2d 536 (1965). Generally, where the
constitutionality of the zoning ordinance is attacked, and not the applicability of the zoning
ordinance to particular facts, the usual administrative procedure need not be exhausted
before institution of judicial proceedings. Kahl v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co.,
191 Md. 249, 60 A.2d 754 (1948): 3 K. DAVIs. ADMINISTRATiVE LAw § 20.04 (1958); Crolly,
Ex'haustion ol Administrative Remedies BeJore Attacking a Zoning Ordinance, 35
N.Y.S.B.J. 329 (1963); 22 MD. L. REv. 252 (1962). But see 34 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 276
(1962).
13 Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College. 221 U.S. 636 (1911) (dictum); Lincoln
County v. Luning. 133 U.S. 529 (1890); Memphis v. Ingram, 195 F.2d 338 (Sth Cir. 1952);
N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd. v. Chicago. 176 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Cooper v.
Westchester County, 42 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
1, Pacific Fruit & Produce Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 41 F. Supp. 175, 180 (D.
Ore. 1941).
"1 Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497. 162 A.2d 378 (1960).
IC 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
' Griffin v. County School Bd.. 377 U.S. 218, 228, ntotion granted, 377 U.S. 950 (1964);
Louisiana State Bd. of Educ. v. Baker. 339 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
11 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell,
182 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. 111. 1960); Merced Dredging Co. v. Merced County, 67 F. Supp. 598
(S.D. Cal. 1946); Ex parte Rice, 259 Ala. 570, 67 So. 2d 825 (1953); private corporations are
also protected by the equal protection clause. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. Co., 118
U.S. 394 (1886).
"1 United States v. Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, rehearing denied, 320 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1963);
United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 90 F. Supp. 73 (\V.D. La. 1950).
21 Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 205 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wis. 1962); Scott v. Frazier, 258 F.
669 (D.N.D. 1919). revd on other grounds, 253 U.S. 243 (1920); State ex rel. New Mexico
State Highway Comm'n v. Taira, 78 N.M. 276,430 P.2d 773 (1967).
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includible within its purview are individual or personal.21
Consequently, municipal corporations have, thus far, not been in-
cludible within the term "person," 2 although they have been held
protected by similar language in at least two state constitutions.'
In Warren County v. Hester where a county brought suit to
recover taxes assessed by and paid to another state, claiming a
violation of the fourteenth amendment, the due process clause was
held to be "utterly without application to the political subdivisions
of a state, which cannot be viewed as a person within the purview
of the constitutional provision. 2 5 Many claims of municipal
corporations to Constitutional protection arise in the course of
litigation against their own states. It has been uniformly recognized
that municipalities may not assert Constitutional guarantees
against their parent states, because the states create and control
their subdivisions 6 Municipal corporations may not assert rights
against their states under the contract clause,2  the fourteenth
amendment generally s the equal prbtection clause,2 1 or the due
21 E.g., Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 205 F. Supp. 673, 675 (W.D. Wis. 1962); Scott v. Frazier,
258 F. Supp. 669, 671 (D.N.D. 1919), rev'don other grounds, 253 U.S. 243 (1920).
2- Los Angeles County v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 522, 526, 18 P.2d 112, 113
(1933); Riley v. Stack, 128 Cal. App. 480, 482, 18 P.2d 110, 112 (1932); Bibb County v.
thancock, 211 Ga. 429, 440-41, 86 S.E.2d 511, 519-20 (1955); .Penny v. Bowden, 199 So. 2d
345, 351 (La. App. 1967); Warren County v. Hester, 219 La. 763, 781, 54 So. 2d 12, 18,
ceri. denied, 342 U.S. 877 (1951); Rosebud County v. Flinn, 109 Mont. 537, 539, 98 P.2d
330, 332 (1940).
2 In re Jensen, 28 Misc. 378, 59 N.Y.S. 653 (Sup. Ct. 1889); Nartis v. Stearns, 17 S.D.
439, 97 N.W. 361 (1903).
"219 La. 763, 54 So. 2d 12, ceri. denied, 342 U.S. 877 (1951).
219 La. at 781, 54 So. 2d at 18 (emphasis added).
E.g., Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907); Worcester v. Worcester Consol.
St. Ry., 196 U.S. 539, 547-48 (1905); El Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. I v. El
Paso, 133 F. Supp. 894, 906 (W.D. Tex. 1955), rejornted in part on other grounds and aJj'd
in part, 243 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 820 (1957); Coronado v. San
Diego Unified Port Dist., 38 Cal. Rptr. 834, 846 (Ct. App. 1964); State ex rel. Spink
v. Kemp, 365 Mo. 368, 283 S.V. 502, 518 (1955); Lisbon v. Lisbon Village Dist., 104 N.H.
255, 258, 183 A.2d 250, 253 (1962); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 27 App. Div. 2d 69, 71, 276
N.Y.S.2d 234, 237 (1966).
1 E.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441 (1939) (dictum); Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil
Co., 250 U.S. 394 (1919); Cranford County v. New York, 38 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
281 U.S. 760 (1930). See F. STRONG, AIaRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 510 (1950).
1 E.g., Risty v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 270 U.S. 378, 390 (1962); Trenton v. New Jersey,
262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923); Shelby v. Pensacola, 112 Fla. 584, 587-88, 151 So. 53, 57 (1933).
Penny v. Bowden, 199 So. 2d 345, 351-52 (La. App. 1967); Bergen County Sewer Auth.
v. Little Ferry, 7 N.J. Super. 213, 222-23, 72 A.2d 886, 891, appeal dismissed, 5 N.J. 548, 76
A.2d 680 (1950); Marshfield v. Cameron, 24 Wis. 56, 63, 127 N.W.2d 809, 813 (1964).
1Eg., Williams v. Mayor& City Council, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933); Newark v. New Jersey,
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process clause0 This is true despite a general leniency where such
suits against the parent relate to either the performance by the
municipalities of their official duties3' or to enforcement of the
subdivision's "proprietary," as opposed to "governmental,"
rights 2
It was noted in Franklin Township v. TugwelP3 that the
rationale for not allowing suit would be inapplicable where the
municipal corporation sought relief from a governmental entity
separate and distinct from its parent state3 This holding is
reiterated in River Vale v. Orangetown, where the Second Circuit
recognized that a municipal corporation's disability in asserting
fourteenth amendment rights against its parent state does not
logically demand that it be disabled for all purposes. From this
recognition, however, the court immediately moved to the
conclusion that a "municipal corporation like any other
corporation is a 'person' within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment . . . ."I It would appear that two different, although
logically related questions, were answered by River Vale. First, the
inability of a municipal corporation to complain of the taking of
property without due process by its parent state is said to arise
262 U.S. 192, 196 (1923); Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 309-10 (1898); State v.
Pensacola. 126 So. 2d 566, 569-70 (Fla. 1961); Providence v. Moulton, 52 R.I. 236, 247, 160
A. 75, 79 (1932).
0 E.g., Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 188 (1923); Brooklyn & Richmond Ferry Co.
v. United States, 167 F.2d 330, 333 (2d Cir. 1948); California Employment Stabilization
Comm'n v. Payne, 31 Cal. 2d 210, 215, 187 P.2d 702, 705 (1947); Hgderson v. Twin Falls
County, 59 Idaho 97, 80 P.2d 801, appeal dismissed, 305 U.S. 568 (1938). But see Williams
v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 310-12 (1898); E. STASON & P. KAUPER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 25 n.2 (3d ed. 1961).
1 E.g.. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1939); Board of Educ. of Central School
Dist. No. I v. Allen, 51 Misc. 2d 297, 300, 273 N.Y.S.2d 239, 242-43 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
3 E.g.. People v. Common Council, 28 Mich. 228, 15 Am. Rep. 202 (1873); Boonville v.
Maltbie, 156 Misc. 6, 11,281 N.Y.S. 787, 791 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Shirk v. Lancaster City, 313 Pa.
158, 163-64, 169 A. 557, 559-60 (1933). It was often hard to distinguish between "proprietary"
and "governmental" functions, however. Compare the above cases with Reclamation Dist.
v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. 672, 154 P. 845, 848 (1927). The distinction was apparently laid
to rest in Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 191 (1923). Now, "'li]t seems rather unlikely
that the United States Supreme Court will strike down as violative of the due process clause
of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment any legislative controls of municipal corporations." I C.
A\-NiEAu. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 2.03 (1964). But see E. MCQtUILLIN, THE LAW
OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.20 (3d ed. 1966).
= 85 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
Id. at 213.
403 F.2d at 686.
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
from the fact that municipalities are within the plenary control of
state legislatures 6 Since municipal corporations exist at the
pleasure of the state governments, they cannot object to a taking
without due process by their creator; the "legislative body,
conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will,
unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United
States. '"11 Since River Vale involved a taking by a political entity
which did not have plenary control over the municipal corporation,
the Second Circuit could see no reason to withhold federal
constitutional protection. Beyond this determination, however,
there is a second question-one of basic constitutional
interpretation. Is a state political subdivision a "person" within the
fourteenth amendment? Several factors indicate that the affirmative
answer of River Vale is inconsistent with analogous constitutional
theories and the history of the fourteenth amendment. Rights under
the fourteenth amendment have not been extended to the several
states ".3 An early rationale for this denial was that the amendment
was intended to guarantee Negroes their freedom9' and that this
intent does not include protection of a sovereign.0 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has consistently treated fourteenth amendment
rights as being guaranteed to "the individual."" These rights have
also been spoken of as applicable to "human beings"' 4 or "natural
persons. '4 3 The language of the due process clause has been held to
be clear enough on its face to exclude a sovereign from protection"4
and this conclusion is reinforced by an examination of instances of
usage of the term "person" elsewhere in the fourteenth
amendment'5 and the Constitution" so that only natural persons
See notes 26 & 30 supra and accompanying text.
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907).
See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
'See, e.g., Holden v. Hardey, 169 U.S. 366, 382 (1897); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1879); In re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 68-69 (1872).
40 United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 90 F. Supp. 73, 96 (W.D. La. 1950).
" E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948); Missouri etv rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337,351 (1938); McCabev. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914).
'z E.g., Alexander v. Alexander, 140 F. Supp. 925, 928 (W.D.S.C. 1956).
E.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939); United States v. Biloxi Municipal School
Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691, 693 (S.D. Miss. 1963); Mickey v. Kansas City, 43 F. Supp. 739,
741-42 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
"Scott v. Frazier, 258 F. Supp. 669, 671 (D.N.D. 1919), rev'd on other grounds, 253 U.S.
243 (1920).
E.g., "'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."
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would seem to be included. Since, "in common usage, the term
"person' does not include the sovereign," 417 and since an intent to
protect the states would have presumably been made clear, the
conclusion is seemingly reached that the several states were not
intended to be protected. Arguably, there should be consistency of
treatment between states and their subdivisions, and the River
Vale conclusion is unwarranted. Municipal corporations, with
regard to "individualness," differ only in degree from the United
States and the several states. A contrary result in River Vale
would, however, leave a municipality without a direct remedy where
the threatened action is only vulnerable to attack on constitutional
grounds. Indirect protection' may be available in the form of a
taxpayers' suit by individual citizens of the municipality. Such suits
have long been recognized"5 and may be brought in federal court.'
An obstacle to a class action by taxpayers in federal court, however,
is that the amount in controversy cannot be met through
aggregation of all the claims of the class. u
The terse River Vale decision establishes the seemingly
anomolous rule that a municipality, while not a "person" under
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added). Also note § 2, apportioning
Representatives according to population "counting the whole number of persons in each
state. . ." (emphasis added).
"See United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 90 F. Supp. 73, 96 (W.D. La. 1950), citing U.S.
Co.4sT. art. 1. § 2; art. 1. § 6; art. 1. § 7; art. 1. § 9; art. II, § 1; art. III, § 3; art.
IV, § 2; amend. IV.
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941).
' Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601, 609 (1879). See also Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447, 486 (1923). Such suits have been most often utilized to protect the tax fund from
misuse by the municipality's own leaders, but it has been held that there is "no distinction
where . . . the same injury is threatened by the action of an outside agency. The injury to
the citizen is the same, and the right to prevent the injury should be the same, whether it is
threatened by the municipality or by some other governmental agency." Franklin Township
v. Tugwell, 85 F.2d 208, 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 1936). See generally Note, Taxpayer's Suits: A
Surver and Sunnarr; 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960).
" See. e.g., Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 433-35 (1952); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
' See. e.g.. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306
U.S. 583 (1939); Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243 (1920); Pinel v. Pinel 240 U.S. 594
(1916); Rogers v. Hennepin County, 239 U.S. 621 (1916); Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead &
Co.. 222 U.S. 39 (1911); Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379 (1901); Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d
323, 327-28 (3d Cir. 1965). Contra Brown v. Trousdale, 138 U.S. 389 (1891); Note,
Taxpayer's Suits: A Surver and Sununari', 69 YALE L.J. 895, 920-21 (1960).
In the instant case there were individual plaintiffs whose complaints were dismissed for
failure to allege the jurisdictional amount. 403 F.2d at 685.
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the fourteenth amendment when it seeks relief against its parent
state, becomes a "person" when its action is against an out-of-
state municipality. This is nevertheless a reasonable rule because
the concepts of "person" and "non-person" are only symbols for
the legal relationship between the municipal corporation and its
defendant. When the defendant is not the parent state, the
continued disability of the municipality would be the product of a
hollow formalism. The denomination of the municipal corporation
as a "person," while inconsistent with other constitutional
doctrines, can also be justified by one view of the basis of the right tojust compensation. American courts, in requiring just compensation
for the taking of property, have failed to designate clearly the
origin of that requirement. The fifth amendment prohibits the
federal government from taking "private property . .. for public
use, without just compensation.' 1 t This has been held to include
state-owned property 2 In a previous clause the deprivation of "any
person['s]" property without due process is prohibited, 3 but the
just compensation clause itself does not contain any reference to
"persons." Over two-thirds of the state constitutions 4 prohibit the
taking of private property without "just," "'reasonable," or "due"
compensation,5 5 but -where a state has failed to protect an
individual, the Supreme Court has held that the power of eminent
domain is also subject to due process limitations under the
fourteenth amendment.56 Thus, the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause has been read as if it contained a "just
compensation" provision which protects private property without
requiring that a "person" be involved. Future litigation will
"' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
S!See St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 100-01 (1893); California v.
United States, 395 F.2d 261, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1968).
' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
-. H. KALTENBACH. JUST CoMPENsATIox REVISED § 1-1-2 (1964). Kansas courts have held
that the state's eminent domain power is limited by the fifth amendment. Id. North Carolina
courts hold that no constitutional limitation is needed since a property owner's right to just
compensation is an integral part of "'the law of the land." De Bruhl v. State Highway &
Pub. Works Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 675-77, 102 S.E.2d 229, 232-33 (1958).
See Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203, 204-05 (1945).
Conceivably, there could be a taking sviih due process, which did not require just
compensation. However, it has been held that -[u]nder the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment ... no state can deprive an individual of his property without just
compensation." De Bruhl v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 676,
102 S.E. 2d 229, 233 (1958). See Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182,
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certainly arise from the interdependent relationships of contiguous
metropolitan municipalities, separated by only a state border. The
River Vale decision imposes reciprocal obligations of due process
on such municipal corporations.
195 (1928); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-15 (1922); Hairston v.
Danville & W. Ry., 208 U.S. 598, 605-07 (1908).
